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The question of trauma and the issue of colonial violence and suffering, which independently 
have been on the critical and theoretical agenda since the 1980s, have only recently begun to 
be linked. Part of the blame for this prolonged stand-off falls to the field of trauma studies, 
which until recently failed to live up to the transcultural promise voiced by Cathy Caruth, in 
one of the field‟s foundational texts, that these days “trauma itself may provide the very link 
between cultures.”1 Many critics have noted that this ambition was always compromised by 
the Eurocentric framework that the study of trauma too uncritically adopted.
2
 While this 
undeniable Eurocentrism, which is often located in the field‟s reliance on psychoanalytical 
concepts, accounts for trauma studies‟ blindness to the legacies of colonialism, it does not 
fully explain the other half of the story of this postponed encounter: postcolonial theory‟s 
reluctance to engage the trauma paradigm. Part of the problem is that trauma studies emerged 
in close proximity to questions of Jewish memory, and as Bryan Cheyette has shown, “there 
is a strand of postcolonial theory which is unable to perceive Jews as anything other than as 
part of a majoritarian tradition.” 3 Before they wrote influential accounts of traumatic 
memory,
4
 two of the leading theorists of trauma, the psychiatrist Dori Laub and the literary 
critic Geoffrey Hartman, were involved in the founding of the Fortunoff Video Archive for 
Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University in the early 1980s, which has been filming 
thousands of interviews with witnesses and survivors of the Holocaust. Due to the prevalent 
postcolonial hesitancy in recognizing Jewish experiences as minoritarian experiences, the 
institutional association of trauma with Jewish memory has long complicated trauma‟s role in 
promoting the transcultural circulation of memories of suffering. 
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The work of Geoffrey Hartman, which almost embodies the association between trauma 
and Holocaust memory, may seem the worst place to track new perspectives on the 
transcultural dynamic of painful memories. This essay argues that Hartman‟s memory work, 
far from being focused on questions of Jewish identity, needs to be understood within the 
parameters of the theory of modernity that undergirds his work, and in which Wordsworth 
counts for much more than Moses. Even if this theory of modernity is problematic indeed, as I 
will not fail to underline, the aesthetic of video testimony that it informs can make a crucial 
contribution to contemporary discussions of the migration of Holocaust memory beyond the 
confines of Jewish experience. In contrast to such influential accounts as those of the 
sociologist Jeffrey Alexander on the „universalization‟ of the Holocaust and of the literary 
critic Michael Rothberg on the „multidirectional‟ dynamics of collective memory, Hartman‟s 
work advocates an aesthetic that makes memories of disaster radically „unclaimable‟ by 
particular identitarian positions. His emphasis on the dangers of memory claims and his 
investment in the aesthetic power to pre-empt such claims underline the transcultural dynamic 
propelling the memory of disaster in a globalized world; at the same time, I argue that these 
insights into the afflictions of memory and identity are limited by a failure to appreciate that 
the „claiming‟ of memory by subaltern groups can in certain circumstances play an enabling 
role in furthering a transcultural agenda. I explain this tension in Hartman‟s work by showing 
that for him, the link between memory and identity has today essentially become a formation 
of melancholia – a destructive posture that obsessively holds on to particular experiences of 
loss while anxiously pre-empting their transcultural circulation. While Hartman‟s account 
offers crucial corrections to rival theories (notably those of Alexander and Rothberg), it is 
compromised by his inability to observe that melancholia is not always a destructive attitude, 
and is sometimes even a strategic necessity in clamoring for the public acknowledgement of 
minoritarian experiences.   
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I  
Ever since the publication of his first book, The Unmediated Vision, in 1954, and especially 
since his landmark study Wordsworth‟s Poetry from 1964, Geoffrey Hartman‟s work has 
been undergirded by a peculiar investment in the crucial contribution that Romanticism in 
general, and Wordsworth in particular, have made to modernity.
5
 This investment is 
inevitably marked by a double temporality: on the one hand, there is the historical claim that 
Wordsworth‟s work has had a vital impact on modernity, while on the other, the 
pervasiveness of this prior claim in Hartman‟s work implies the further contention that it is 
worth remembering that contribution today. Wordsworth, in other words, organizes 
Hartman‟s work both as a historical achievement and as a critical promise. His historical role 
is unambiguously formulated in The Fateful Question of Culture from 1997, which contains 
the texts of Hartman‟s 1992 Wellek Library Lectures in Critical Theory. Hartman puts 
forward the ambitious and highly speculative thesis that “Wordsworth, writing near the 
beginning of the industrial revolution, achieves a precarious cultural transfer (translatio) of 
English rural life.”6 His poetry neither cultivated the rural past as an available alternative nor 
denied its persistent appeal to a disinherited modern imagination; by giving a poetic shape to 
“what in English culture was previously unrealized or semi-articulate, a potententiality only,” 
he pre-empted the phantasmagorical afterlife of the pre-industrial past as a source of anti-
modern resentment. The most notable long-term effect of this achievement is that English 
culture, which uniquely profited from Wordsworth‟s poetic mediation, did not have to live 
through the trauma of the disastrous deterioration of modernity to which Germany and 
France, among others, were exposed in the twentieth century. Hartman speculates that 
Wordsworth‟s poetry “saved English politics from the virulence of a nostalgic political ideal 
centering on rural virtue, which led to serious ravages on the continent.”7  
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There are obvious problems with this historical claim. If it is uncontroversial enough to 
state that nothing comparable to the Holocaust has taken place on English soil, Hartman‟s 
Wordsworthian fantasy of an untraumatic national continuity glosses over at least two forms 
of violence: first, structural (rather than evental) forms of violence that are an inseparable part 
of English society, and second, the violence and the suffering that England has exported in the 
name of imperialism and colonialism. Leaving this line of critique aside for now, it is clear 
that Hartman‟s project faces the challenge of asserting the relevance of Wordsworth‟s 
historical achievement for contemporary culture. One crucial step in the wishful transfer of 
Wordsworth‟s Romanticism to the present is the assumption that the condition in which 
Wordsworth so successfully intervened is still – or again – the plight besetting contemporary 
culture. For Hartman, Wordsworth‟s poetry confronted a condition of “phantomization” and 
“derealization” brought on by the onset of commodity capitalism and industrialization‟s 
displacement of time-honored realities; his poetic mediation prevented these ghosts from 
persisting and fatally hardening into “an unprogressive, overidealized, image of what is lost, 
and thus a deeply anti-urban sentiment.”8 Against a culture of abstraction, Wordsworth 
offered the hope of embodiment. Such abstraction, for Hartman, also afflicts contemporary 
culture, which, for him, is essentially a visual culture: “with the advent of television, a new 
kind of communal memory is created, promoting false embodiments … each superrealism 
proves to be a phantom.”9 The operation of television is emblematic of contemporary culture 
as such, and it produces a condition that desperately calls for an update of Wordsworth‟s 
poetic power. That Hartman lays the blame for contemporary phenomena of derealization and 
phantomization with visual culture, rather than with, for instance, recent developments in 
finance capitalism or globalization, as is more routinely done, points to a characteristic 
blindness in his analysis. 
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There is a double problem with TV. First, it is simply too powerful a “form of 
communication”: its accumulation of ever more images has a “powerful, repetitive, everyday 
– and so potentially trivializing – effect,” until the information and images it keeps feeding us 
can no longer be “assimilated” and “absorbed.”10 Second, TV not only erodes the possibility 
of genuine experience, as it also contributes to the “derealization of ordinary life” and to the 
“ghosting of reality”; it does not “respect the absence of … absent things” but rather “conveys 
the illusion not of making absent things present but present things more present.”11 TV, in 
short, multiplies presences to the point where absence, grief, and loss no longer find a place 
and things can no longer be experienced, and where everything merges in a phantom space of 
hyperbolic visuality. It provokes a condition that calls for an update of a Wordsworthian 
poetics that counters the dynamic of multiplication and phantomization by insisting on the 
actuality of “the still unmediated, accessible, and integral – yet barely so – presence of a half-
perceived and half-created mode of life.”12 Wordsworth recognized the actuality of what 
resisted foregrounding, and he preserved pastoral culture as an unactualized and incomplete 
potentiality, which is to say as a reality that can only be reclaimed in its incompleteness, never 
as a full-fledged alternative to the modern condition. His poetry gave a definite shape to the 
ghostly persistence of the past, a persistence that, to the extent that it cannot be denied, 
demands some kind of embodiment. 
Hartman recognizes that such an update today can no longer take the shape of poetry, as 
that medium has lost the authority to make a difference in a primarily visual culture. 
Remarkably, his work on Holocaust video testimony displays a tendency to theorize that 
genre as a contemporary instantiation of Wordsworth‟s saving mediation – as a force, that is, 
that because of its visual status can confront visual culture‟s tendency to abstraction head-on. 
Most of his writings on video testimony have been produced in the context of his involvement 
with the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University, which has 
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been recording and storing thousands of interviews with Holocaust witnesses and survivors. 
Hartman‟s extensive writings on this project have developed a particular poetics – or “optic,” 
as he also calls it – that defines video testimony as a genre in its own right.13 For Hartman, 
video testimony‟s particular optic functions as a “counter-cinematic” genre that “use[s] 
television to cure television, to turn the medium against itself, limiting while exploiting its 
visualizing power.”14 
Hartman‟s work on video testimony is not a Fremdkörper in a career dedicated to the 
forms and functions of Romanticism: only taking off in the 1980s, when that career had 
already been well under way for three decades, it testifies to Hartman‟s concern to promote 
the pressing relevance of the particular mode of memorialization that he had unearthed in 
Wordsworth.
15
 His analysis of public memory is organized by a barely disguised analogy 
between the age of Wordsworth and late modernity: just as Wordsworth‟s poetry managed to 
mediate the trauma of the transition to modernity in a way that saved England from 
compulsively repeating that trauma in the form of an English Holocaust, so the genre of video 
testimony gives shape to a late modern belatedness in relation to the Holocaust in a way that 
will interrupt the cycle of extreme violence. This structural analogy pre-empts all attempts to 
immunize the Holocaust from comparisons to other memories of extreme violence; it 
underlines Hartman‟s refusal to concede the viability of any exclusive claims on traumatic 
memories. Video testimony is essentially an effort to re-embody the different forms of 
ghostliness that afflict contemporary life: the derealization spread by the media, our 
unchecked exposure to images of suffering and terror, the fading of the memory of 
catastrophe as generations of survivors disappear, and also “the phantomization or 
dissociation endemic to trauma.”16 Hartman‟s most concise formulation of the rationale 
behind the optic of video testimony leaves no doubts about the Wordsworthian inspiration of 
this enterprise:  
Video Testimony, Modernity, and the Claims of Melancholia  -  
 
7 
 
Video is important because the voice as such, without a visible source, remains ghostly. 
That is, when you take away the visual, when you just hear the voice, the effect is that of 
disembodied sound, as if from the dead, from an absence. Voice has its own affective 
quality, but we feel it essential to add a face to that voice, to reduce the ghostliness, even 
to re-embody the voice.
17
 
 
Video borrows television‟s visualizing powers not in order to make present things more 
present, but rather to give a visible and experienceable shape to testimonies that by definition 
deal with memories that are themselves no longer accessible to experience. Hartman‟s video 
optic, that is, is designed to enable an immediate experience of our remove from the 
catastrophe – a distance that is figured by the witness who is being filmed. A crucial 
challenge faced by this optic is developing a way to convey the “immediacy” of the interview, 
the fact that it is the registration of “a one-time event” happening “on the spot.”18 This 
concern informs the Fortunoff Archive‟s decision not to make the interviews available on the 
internet, but to force potential viewers to actually travel to Yale in order to watch the video 
interviews there.
19
 The filming itself also aims to convey to the viewer the immediacy and 
uniqueness of the event: the interviewers only use one camera that consistently focuses on the 
witness, and they only rarely ask questions or prompt the interviewees. This minimalism 
contributes to the immediacy of the experience – i.e., to an immediate experience of our non-
experience of the memories that the witness recounts. 
In the same way that Wordsworth‟s poetic mediations rendered the traumatic memory of 
the industrial interruption of pastoral unavailable to claims that would mobilize it for the 
cultivation of anti-modern resentment, video testimony resists our overidentification with the 
atrocities of the Holocaust by having its viewer experience her remove from the disaster. 
Video testimony denies the viewer the vicarious thrill of retraumatization, and affords an 
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experience that posits her at a decisive distance from the traumatic event. It ensures that these 
memories cannot be claimed as the exclusive property of any constituency. Hartman‟s 
emphasis on remove – or on non-experience – is only as crucial as his emphasis on 
experience; the fact that video testimony affords an immediate experience of the non-
experience of the disaster allows it to serve as a point of orientation that stabilizes what 
Hartman analyzes as the phantom space of contemporary memory culture. Video testimony 
mediates our generational, geographical, and psychological distance from the experiences that 
are being recounted in a way that makes it possible to absorb and experience that remove. As 
such, it generates the position of what Hartman calls the “adoptive or intellectual witness,”20 
that is, “a bystander after the event who observes it from an ambiguous position.”21 The 
intellectual witness is, on the one hand, “detached or belated” in relation to the event, while 
she is also, on the other, unable not to be addressed by it and therefore called to “a more 
participatory state of mind.”22 Hartman‟s work on video testimony proposes a conception of 
the contemporary subject as defined by the experience of its palpable separation from disaster 
– a separation that can refer to a generational remove from the Holocaust, to people‟s non-
participation in evident histories of suffering, or to the paradoxically derealizing effects of the 
omnipresence of images of extreme violence in contemporary culture.
23
 
This double focus on experience and distance is complemented in Hartman‟s account by an 
insistence on the fact that the interviewers in the video testimonies “form a provisional 
community and become, for the survivor-witness, representative of a potentially larger 
community.”24 Hartman uses Maurice Halbwachs‟s notion of an „affective community‟ to 
characterize this “supportive group ready to be a „witness to the witness‟.”25 The act of 
witnessing the witness provides the occasion for an experience that can ground a non-
exclusive and non-identitarian form of community open to all who want to share this specific 
experience of a missed experience; it appeals “to a human commonality that does not imply 
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uniformity.”26 Importantly, this provisional community cannot possibly be specifically 
Jewish, but is inescapably transcultural: video testimony foregrounds a necessary remove 
from the experiences that the witnesses recount, and this makes these memories radically „un-
claimable‟ – which is to say, equally (un)available to everyone who is willing to share that 
remove. The logic of this theorization of the genre of video testimony entails that the 
experience of distance can circulate and travel across cultural borders – indeed, it cannot help 
but transgress such borders, as the one thing it does not allow is being „claimed‟ as a sacred 
and exclusive possession. 
 
II 
For Hartman, the genre of video testimony mediates our inevitable separation from 
catastrophe in a way that makes it possible to absorb and experience that remove. In order for 
us to appreciate the stakes of video testimony‟s curative operation, it is helpful to look at the 
potential ravages in response to which Hartman develops this claim. Video testimony is 
theorized as a technology that can prevent these calamities, and this explains why these 
dangers are in their turn connected to competing „optics‟ of memory. If video testimony is a 
mediation that makes it possible to directly experience one‟s generational, geographical, and 
psychological distance from the Holocaust in a way that ties the viewer to these memories 
without retraumatizing her, a first danger in the mediation of catastrophe is a failure to let that 
distance be experienced. Hartman observes this danger in Spielberg‟s Schindler‟s List, which 
for him merely repeats television‟s invisible assault on experience. Recall that television has 
become “an intimate part of home,” and as such “it becomes a treacherous servomechanism 
conspiring with a residual, delusory omnipotence of thoughts.”27 Schindler‟s List feeds the 
same illusion: Hartman writes that “the premium placed on visuality by such a film made me 
deeply uneasy. To see things that sharply, and from a privileged position, is to see them with 
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the eyes of those who had the power of life and death.”28 The film‟s ambition to encompass 
the enormity of the events through visual means does not achieve the reality-effect that it 
intends, but instead leads to a film that is not realistic enough, as it fails to capture the texture 
of “the daily suffering in camp or ghetto” that the genre of video testimony does pay attention 
to.
29
 For this reason Hartman follows a broad critical consensus and prefers Claude 
Lanzmann‟s Shoah, which does attempt to recover and communicate the details of how the 
Holocaust was implemented. Still, Lanzmann comes very close to the second danger involved 
in the mediation of catastrophe: not a failure to let the events be experienced, but a failure to 
emphasize the distance that separates the viewer from them. Lanzmann‟s approach sometimes 
risks a “vicarious overidentification with the victim.”30 The main marker of Lanzmann‟s 
desire for a quasi-“mystical correspondence” is that, for all his commendable attention to 
detail, he “does not appear to be all that interested in the survivors‟ life or afterlife.”31 
It is the third risk involved in the mediation of traumatic memory that threatens to induce 
the uncompromising identity-claims that the aesthetic of video testimony must ward off. This 
is a scenario in which the horrors of the past – or indeed the present – are fed to the viewer 
without any mediation that makes them digestible or even accessible to experience 
(Spielberg‟s error), nor any acknowledgement of the viewer‟s non-involvement in them (as 
almost happens in the case of Shoah). The viewer is confronted with the enormity of evil and 
pain in a way that makes it impossible to make these horrors, or even her remove from them, 
a part of her identity. When it is impossible to meaningfully connect to the catastrophes from 
which the viewer is removed, she is abandoned to what Hartman calls “the vertigo of 
indecisiveness or nonidentity,” which can foster “by reaction even more dangerous … 
assertions.”32 Hartman is thinking here not only of “the proliferation and dailiness of second-
order images of trauma” in the media,33 but also of discourses of postmemory that describe 
how traumatic memory is passed on to later generations, and of aesthetic practices that rely on 
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so-called secondary trauma – i.e., on “producing rather than screening the effect of trauma.”34 
For Hartman, the shocks of unmediated or unscreened traumas cannot be absorbed and 
assimilated, and merely address us on an affective level – which gives rise to feelings of 
powerlessness and disorientation that may generate a desire for violent overcompensation.  
Hartman‟s work on video testimony is emphatically a second-generation discourse that is 
primarily interested in the question of how to manage a factual separation from experiences of 
extreme violence that one yet cannot fail to be addressed by. The main dangers involved are 
processes of secondary traumatization, in which, in Ernst van Alphen‟s words, a factual “lack 
of memories and a lack of continuity” register as a “vertigo … in which suffering takes the 
place of inheritance.”35 The ghostliness that characterizes this vertigo of nonidentity may 
tempt people toward exclusionary and identitarian forms of embodiment, which brings on the 
threat of a repetition of the catastrophe that video testimony seeks to mediate into a promise 
of transcultural community. For Hartman, video testimony, as well as other aesthetic 
mediations of the Holocaust, must firmly embody the ghosts that trauma generates in a way 
that prevents such a vertigo of nonidentity. Such a “non-traumatizing mode of representation” 
should aesthetically refigure our remove as a manageable and tenable intellectual distance.
36
 
In the context of a present-day memory culture in which it is “no longer possible not to 
know,” yet where the accumulation of ever more “positivities” has led to “an extraordinary 
and melancholy record” rather than to “appreciable ethical lessons,” it generates the 
possibility of assimilating knowledge of the past in a way that neither retraumatizes the 
viewer nor forces her to deny the knowledge she cannot avoid.
37
  
Hartman‟s refusal of secondary traumatization as a strategy to “reconnect and reembody 
[a] memorial fabric that has been severed by catastrophe” ties in with his fear that a failed 
embodiment of the ghosts of the past will be followed by an identitarian vertigo that will in its 
turn generate a reactive overassertion of identity.
38
 In the following section, I will analyze this 
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dynamic as a form of melancholia. Importantly, the analogy between Wordsworth and video 
testimony that underlies Hartman‟s work on Holocaust memory implies that there is a close 
affinity between present-day afflictions such as retraumatization, identitarian vertigo, and the 
danger of overidentification, on the one hand, and some of the psycho-social conditions that – 
unlike Wordsworth – failed to prevent the Holocaust on the other. It suggests that the 
deterioration of modernity on the continent was, among many other things, an effect of a 
disabling sense of vertigo and belatedness. If the contemporary ubiquity of exclusionary 
identity formations allows us to understand the vigor of Hartman‟s insistence on the „un-
claiming‟ of trauma, lingering on this analogy a little longer puts his investment in this 
position into even starker relief. The idea that the Holocaust was an effect of a sense of 
vertigo and belatedness is not confined to Hartman‟s work alone: we also find it, for instance, 
in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy‟s famous essay entitled “The Nazi Myth,” 
which locates the scenario of a failed embodiment leading to vertigo and then to an 
overassertion of identity at the origin of Nazism. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy write that while 
Europe after the collapse of Christianity in the eighteenth century redefined itself through the 
historical imitation of classical models, Germany found itself in a particularly difficult 
position: “The drama of Germany was also that it suffered an imitation twice removed, and 
saw itself obliged to imitate the imitation of antiquity that France did not cease to export for at 
least two centuries. Germany, in other words, was not only missing an identity but also lacked 
the ownership of its means of identification.”39 Germany had no forms of its own to mediate 
the trauma of the collapse of Christianity, nor could the French forms that were available 
satisfy the desire for identity. Germany suffered what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy tellingly 
call “the vertigo of an absence of identity,” and this vertigo fatefully panicked Germany into 
an exclusionary and identitarian myth of purity. Once these implications of the barely 
disguised analogy that informs Hartman‟s optic of video testimony are made explicit, we can 
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see that it is important to underline – more emphatically than Hartman himself does – this 
optic‟s potential to offer an alternative to traditional forms of Gemeinschaft and to intimate an 
explicitly transcultural form of community.  
 
III 
That Hartman‟s theoretical work formulates such a transcultural promise does not prevent that 
his critical practice often fails to live up to it. That this promise is hard to substantiate in 
critical practice can already be glimpsed from the tension between, on the one hand, the 
grandiose cultural power of video testimonies that is suggested by the implicit analogy to 
Wordsworth – who after all managed to affect nothing less than English collective memory – 
and the factual restrictedness of their circulation in rarified „affective communities‟ on the 
other. Hartman‟s work invariably theorizes genuine experience – such as that allegedly 
afforded by video testimony – in opposition to mass media circulation, which is consistently 
and somewhat tendentiously linked to phantomization and derealization. However, even if 
video testimony‟s transcultural promise is bound to remain theoretical, it is worth locating 
Hartman‟s insistence on the „unclaimability‟ of trauma in the context of other accounts of the 
transcultural migration of trauma. Indeed, what motivates Hartman to emphasize the need, in 
our contemporary media culture, to save memories and traumas from any exclusive claims 
upon them? Hartman is not alone in dislodging the memory of the Holocaust from exclusively 
Jewish claims. In an influential essay on “The Social Construction of Moral Universals,” the 
sociologist Jeffrey Alexander has mapped the progressive „universalization‟ of the Holocaust. 
According to Alexander, since the Eichmann trial in 1961 the Holocaust has developed into a 
universal touchstone that sheds light on other atrocities, and that can generate “unprecedented 
opportunities for ethnic, racial, and religious justice, for mutual recognition, and for global 
conflicts becoming regulated in a more civil way.”40 Alexander‟s optimistic account traces 
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how the memory of the Holocaust has, for almost half a century, circulated beyond the 
confines of particular identities and constituencies; it does so by presenting the Holocaust as a 
sort of superconductor that brings us directly from the singular to the universal, and that, 
precisely because of the ease with which it leaves behind the constraints of particular 
contexts, precludes a more patient comparative consideration of local mobilizations of 
Holocaust memory. Skipping a more detailed and historically dense consideration of the ways 
Holocaust memory has historically interacted with other memories of extreme violence, 
Alexander summarily asserts that “[t]he horrific trauma of the Jews became the trauma of all 
humankind” when the Holocaust “no longer referred to events that took place at a particular 
time and place.”41 This is very different from Hartman‟s account: his insistence on concrete, 
individual experience in the transmission of memory signals a resistance to such a notion of 
the Holocaust as a universally available signifier that is not burdened with the weight of 
particular experiences.  
This criticism of Alexander has also been made by Michael Rothberg, whose book 
Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization takes 
more care not to simply collapse “the transnational, the global, and the comparative into the 
universal.”42 It shows how particular mobilizations of Holocaust memory always occur in, 
and are often made possible by, contexts that are saturated with other memories of extreme 
violence. In contrast to Alexander‟s relative disinterest in particular constellations of memory, 
Rothberg demonstrates how every manifestation of memory is “dense with overlapping 
possibilities and dangers.”43 By tracing how a wide variety of particular memory claims is 
overdetermined by the overlap of different memories and histories, Rothberg‟s (roughly 
Benjaminian) approach allows the constellations of memorial vectors he recovers – often 
instances of colonial violence and of the Holocaust – to crystallize into monads that testify to 
the mobility and multidirectionality that characterize the transcultural circulation of memory. 
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While Rothberg‟s many detailed case studies, each of which maps the ways a particular 
constellation of memory articulates different traditions of remembrance, bear out Hartman‟s 
insistence on the transcultural circulation of the memory of the disaster as well as on the vital 
role of concrete experience, they at the same time manage to throw into stark relief one 
crucial limitation of Hartman‟s work. For Hartman, the crystallization of memory can never 
materialize as a collective effort, as that would, for him, imply an identitarian claim on what 
video testimony renders „un-claimable‟; the site of crystallization – where the transcultural 
nature of memory is realized – can, for Hartman, only ever be the individual (rather than the 
collective) subject experiencing its non-experience of the disaster.
44
 The only sense of 
collectivity that this picture allows is what Alphonso Lingis once called a community of those 
who have nothing in common.
45
 Such an insistence on an exceedingly bare form of 
togetherness precludes what for Rothberg is one of the main motivations for retrieving the 
multidirectional constitution of collective memory: the fact that it makes room for “complex 
acts of solidarity in which historical memory serves as a medium for the creation of new 
communal and political identities.”46 What Hartman‟s work fails to recognize is that in 
transcultural contexts, some sort of collective memory claim may well be strategically 
necessary in order to promote such solidarity.  
Still, in spite of this limitation, Hartman‟s insistence on the careful „un-claiming‟ of trauma 
in its turn offers one crucial addition to Rothberg‟s theory of the multidirectionality of 
memory – of memory “as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; 
as productive and not privative.”47 Rothberg insists on “the productive, intercultural dynamic 
of multidirectional memory” in order to dislodge the idea that collective identity is predicated 
on exclusive memory claims. He rejects the closely connected ideas “that a straight line runs 
from memory to identity and that the only kinds of memories and identities that are therefore 
possible are ones that exclude elements of alterity and forms of commonality with others.”48 
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Rothberg codes the distinction between a productive interaction of memories and 
exclusionary claims on particular memories that aggressively resist such interaction as the 
difference between multidirectional and competitive memory. I argue that we can arrive at a 
better – and certainly a more realistic – phenomenology of such a destructive relationship 
between memory, identity, and violence that refuses interaction by mapping it onto Freud‟s 
seminal account of melancholia – which implicitly structures Hartman‟s work on the 
circulation of memories. As is well known, Freud‟s seminal essay on “Trauer und 
Melancholia” [“Mourning and Melancholia”] opposes two ways of dealing with loss: 
mourning, which Freud considers a normal, healthy response to loss, and melancholia, which 
he castigates as a pathological and self-destructive response. In normal processes of 
mourning, the mourner is able to work through grief in a relatively unambivalent fashion; she 
slowly and painfully reconnects to the outside world as she regains access to the energies that 
had been invested in the object that is now lost. The melancholic, in contrast, is unable to 
enter into a dynamic relation with new love objects, and even with the outside world more 
generally, as she fails to detach her energies from the object she has lost.
49
 In melancholia, 
experiences of suffering are not shared or circulated, but rather shielded away from the 
outside world. Melancholia is accompanied by feelings of “self-loathing” and a “numbed 
disconnection” from other people and the world; failing to bring the precise extent and nature 
of the loss suffered to consciousness, it is a form of grieving that is “blocked by unconscious 
and displaced aggression.”50 Because of this blockage, it forbids the renewal of dynamic 
object-relations, and forecloses “the capacity to experience new people and relations with 
spontaneity, with a receptivity to experience, to newness, to changes in oneself and others” – 
a capacity that requires a minimal willingness to mourn.
51
 Melancholia, in other words, 
appears as a pathology that checks the productive, interpersonal, and intercultural circulation 
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of memories of suffering and loss and that predicates personal and collective identity on an 
uncompromising attachment to, and an exclusionary claim of, particular traumas or losses. 
Such a melancholic conception of identity, which, in Rothberg‟s words, assumes “that a 
direct line runs between remembrance of the past and the formation of identity in the 
present,”52 is widespread in contemporary culture. Roger Luckhurst has noted that, in our 
memory culture, collective identities tend to “unite around the re-experiencing of their 
woundedness,” rather than recognize their implication in the memories of others.53 The 
account of melancholia suggests that the refusal of multidirectionality that Rothberg identifies 
as the model of competitive memory is a species of melancholia. Indeed, melancholia is the 
real enemy of multidirectional memory: not only does it rob the subject of any desire to 
implicate itself in the world and in other lives, the feelings of self-beratement it generates 
also, as Rothberg notes in relation to the very comparable notion of „victimization,‟ “erode[s] 
the bases of selfhood necessary for relationship with others.”54 If we accept the prevalence of 
melancholic notions of collective identity in our memory culture, Hartman‟s insistence on the 
„un-claiming‟ of memory, which liberates memories from such exclusionary identity-claims, 
emerges as a viable strategy for the promotion of multidirectionality. Moreover, the concept 
of melancholia allows another virtue of Hartman‟s account to stand out: his theorization of the 
phantomization and derealization that are spread by the visual media helps to explain why 
certain groups are panicked into the compensatory affirmation of an identitarian purity that is 
untainted by ghostliness and otherness.
55
  
Hartman‟s case for the „un-claiming‟ of trauma is more attentive to the threats of 
melancholia than Rothberg‟s account. One of Rothberg‟s strategies to theorize 
multidirectional memory is through a novel reading of Freudian screen memory. For 
Rothberg, screen memory does not promote a competitive notion of memory, as “the 
displacement that takes place in screen memory … functions as much to open up lines of 
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communication with the past as to close them off.” He duly notes that “[i]n contemporary 
societies, mediascapes of all kinds play a predominant role” in opening up these lines, but he 
does not consider the circulation of multiple memories as a problem – indeed, if anything, it 
supports his case for multidirectional memory‟s capacity to juxtapose “two or more disturbing 
memories and disrupt[] everyday settings.”56 What is missing in this account is the realization 
that such everyday settings may already be saturated by “the proliferation and dailiness of 
second-order images of trauma” through the media, and that the attempt to disrupt the 
everyday through ever new memory claims may only end up hastening a melancholic refusal 
of multidirectionality.
57
 Hartman‟s account of the dynamic of derealization and melancholia 
makes it possible to see that Rothberg‟s case for multidirectionality‟s capacity to “construct 
solidarity out of specificities, overlaps, and echoes of different historical experiences” 
threatens to pre-empt itself, as it unwittingly induces the melancholic closure of competitive 
memory it aims to displace.
58
 For Rothberg, competitive memory is merely a rival model for 
the understanding of the dynamics of collective memory; what Hartman adds to this account 
is that it is also a melancholic pathology that cannot simply be dislodged by comparative 
thinking alone. 
 
IV 
For Alexander, the circulation of the Holocaust beyond the confines of Jewish experience in 
the last half century has required “detaching the issues surrounding the systematic exercise of 
violence against ethnic groups from any particular ethnicity, religion, nationality, time, or 
place.” This outright de-particularization of trauma has made possible a process of “deepening 
emotional identification.”59 In his response to Alexander, Rothberg notes that detachment 
alone is never enough: memories have to be “„reattached‟ to a new context in order to have 
any moral purchase.”60 The peculiarity of Hartman‟s insistence on the „un-claiming‟ of 
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trauma is that, while it recognizes this need for reattachment – through its uncompromising 
insistence on concrete, individual experience – it paradoxically proposes an attachment to the 
fact of our fateful detachment from the disaster. The very process of reattachment, in other 
words, precludes the mobilization of memory for forging new collectivities. 
We can rephrase this singular position in terms of the familiar trope of the so-called 
“sacralization” of the Holocaust. Hartman‟s repeated insistence on the reality of “thousands of 
survivor testimonies that actually exist” testifies to his refusal to surrender the memory of the 
Holocaust to such categories as the unrepresentable, the incomprehensible, or the ineffable;
61
 
the fact that the Holocaust is structurally articulated with the trauma of industrialization and 
with images of contemporary terror in Hartman‟s work, moreover, undoes the sacred position 
of inviolable uniqueness. Still, such a desacralization of the Holocaust does not for all that 
amount to an outright profanation of it: Hartman‟s theorization of the genre of video 
testimony betrays a desire to replace such a sacred unavailability with a hardly less forbidding 
awareness of the Holocaust‟s withdrawal from our claims upon it. If we understand 
profanation as a process in which “that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and 
is returned to use,” then Hartman‟s desacralization of the Holocaust at the same time 
paradoxically amounts to its „deprofanation.‟62 Hartman recognizes the articulation of the 
Holocaust with other disasters and its implication in the experience of different histories and 
identities, yet these differences are not allowed to matter. The memories of disaster circulate 
in a limbo that precludes both their sacralization and their mobilization for forging strategic 
alliances that hold the potential to further justice and solidarity.    
Hartman‟s relocation of trauma – beyond both separation and claiming – while being 
decidedly unhelpful for forging a progressive politics, offers an entirely realistic account of 
the circulation of memories of disaster and images of suffering in contemporary media 
culture. Indeed, while many members of metropolitan audiences have not themselves 
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experienced extreme violence, they manifestly live in a media-saturated culture in which 
traces of suffering circulate promiscuously. In such a culture, direct traumatic experiences 
(and the possibilities to capitalize on them) are less readily available than the refracted images 
of the suffering of others. Here video testimony intervenes to mediate the contemporary 
subject‟s relation to past disasters and contemporary terror from which it is inevitably 
removed yet by which it is unavoidably addressed. Hartman theorizes video testimony as a 
technology that can prevent the fateful collapse of the ghostliness and intangibility of 
traumatic memory into melancholic claims of exclusiveness and competition.   
Still, while Hartman‟s warnings against a melancholic censoring of the circulation of 
memory touches on a crucial dimension of the way collective memory actually functions in 
Western media culture, it fails to imagine situations in which strategic claims of identity and 
memory can play a vital role in promoting justice. It is here that Hartman‟s work, in spite of 
its recognition of the interconnectedness of memories and of the untenability of exclusive and 
exclusionary claims upon them, appears to be not nearly transcultural enough. For non-
dominant groups, the melancholic refusal to surrender particular memories and to let go of 
particular losses can sustain claims for recognition and justice that can, in their turn, be part of 
the same dialogic and multidirectional process in which the interrelatedness of memory is 
confirmed. Indeed, if the sheer multiplicity of memory claims is likely to incite a melancholic 
overreaction, then so is an outright refusal to recognize such claims – which is the sad fate of 
many minoritarian bids for acknowledgement. Hartman‟s account of the collective memory of 
extreme violence shares this blindness with his account of modernity, in which the 
idiosyncratic identification of English culture with the fantasy of an unhindered and 
untraumatic national continuity fails to recognize the fact that England has not ceased to 
export violence and suffering in the name of imperialism and colonialism, or, more recently, a 
war on terror. England‟s spectacular avoidance of national trauma coincided with the massive 
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exportation of trauma. His account of modernity is, in other words, undergirded by a 
foreclosure of Western modernity‟s colonial realities. This foreclosure asserts itself in his 
work on the memory of extreme violence as a failure to imagine that melancholic claims of 
memory and identity can in certain circumstances be something else than a repetition of the 
disaster they recall.   
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